Wilson On Popper On Science

I like it when I find one of my favourite writers talk about another of my favourite writers, especially when they come from what seem like totally different world views (or reality tunnels, as Wilson would say.) In this instance the writer is Wilson and the one written about is Popper. Since, I guess, I know a lot more about Popper's philosophy than Wilson does, I wish to elaborate on and also correct the passage. In the following passage,  It might seem, by association, that Popper holds the views expressed in the latter half of this paragraph, not just the first sentence that he is mentioned in. Many people might assume that the rest of the passage is actually Wlsons's representation of Popper's views: I am going to be a little unfair to Wilson by  assuming that this is exactly the case. I will assume that all of this passage is a representation of Popper's views and criticize Wilson accordingly. This is so I can elucidate Popper's philosophy, and also quote from one of my favourite authors. The Passage is as follows:

Sir Karl Popper has argued, plausibly I think, that no proposition can ever reach the level of absolutely proven true for all time (1/1) because that would require an infinite number of experiments and we haven't done that many experiments yet, nor does it seem likely that we can do them in any foresee able future . Any of our theories, however, can reach the level of proven false (0) very quickly, since any failed experiment raises doubt, and a long rigorous series of failed experiments must either indicate that (a) the theory has no relation to experimental/experiential data, or else (b) some god or demon has rigged the results just to mislead us.  The latter choice does not rank as a meaningful proposition in science, although it might keep theologians (or some academic multi-culturalists) busy with debate for centuries. 


That being proven true is an aim of science is misleading, since most people who believe in (scientific) proof (i.e induction), do not think that science is looking for truth, but likelihood.  So the 1/1 is not to do with truth, but with certainty. Truth and certainty are often confounded, and many writers, even very smart ones (as Wilson surely is), mix up these very different notions. Compare a similar statement made by Rafe Champion:

It is a commonplace observation that according to the version of the probability calculus that Carnap spent some years of his life to perfect, the probability of a universal Law such as "all ravens are black" is zero.

This does not mean the statement is false.

Certainty has to do with our belief; truth has to do with correspondence of our statements to the world. What Popper was arguing was that we cannot ever confirm our hypotheses to any amount, especially not certainty. With this correction in the passage, the first sentence is now an accurate representation of Popper. Also Popper argued a logical point, it is irrelevant whether it is plausible.

Now, as well as being totally unfair to Wilson, I am going to be, in this next criticism, completely pedantic.  Popper did not argue that something can be proven false. Popper argued on  two subtly different levels which Wilson is not taking into account. There is the level of logic and the level of methodology. On the Logical level there is an asymmetry between verification and falsification. Logically (i.e, in principle) we can, through Modus Tollens, refute a theory (it only takes one piece of counter-evidence for this), but we cannot verify a theory¹, because we need an infinite amount of evidence to verify a theory. Russell argued the same thing, the claim that we have verified a theory, is itself a universal statement that cannot be verified. On the methodological level it is not so straightforward, because a counter-instance itself is tentative (this is why theories cannot be proven false), what goes into a refutation includes not just counter-evidence, but also an explanation of why the theory fails in the light of this counter-evidence.² This is because we cannot just abandon a theory, even if it is false, because we need something work with, and if we only have this theory, we can still use it, because even false theories entail true consequences (and we have found out in which domain this theory gives false consequences).

We will now turn to '(a)' and '(b)' in the text, keeping in mind that I am being totally unfair to Wilson, in order to elucidate what Popper argued for. (a) states that consistent experimental failure means that the hypothesis has no relation to  experimental data, but this is simply false. It does have a relation, two in fact: The hypothesis has a logical relation and subsequently an informative relation. The counter-evidence of the theory counts as a refutation (which is the logical modus tollens) and all counter-evidence is the refuted theories information content , since counter-evidence is not something that theory predicts and so in repsect to the theory we are testing it is informative i.e it is not contained in the class of its logical consequences. Wilson also mentions a similar thing about what information is, and strikes gold in his book promethes rising, but misses its actual value, because he is a subjectivist about information, (for the discussion about the subjectivist view of information, see  Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics, by Popper).

'(b)' states that the Cartesian Demon is 'meaningless' in science. This is a very old and stable misconception of the demarcation between science and metaphysics (even those who purport to understand it) The demarcation has to lie inside meaning, if not then we end up with a principle which is meaningless, simply because it cannot be scientific. So therefore the demarcation has to be between meaningful scientific and meaningful metaphysical statements. This demarcation comes in the form of the falsificationist principle outlined above: something is scientific in so far as it can be, in principle, refuted. The Cartesian demon, therefore, is not meaningless, it is untestable (i.e unfalsifiable); it is perfectly meaningful, even scientifically, It is just not scientific.

Another further thing in relation to cartesian doubt: Popper argued  that doubt does not count a criticism of a theory or a statement. A theory can be true, even if we cannot prove it and even if we doubt it - doubt is always possible, and so empty as a criticism of anything. 

Popper argued that we should aim for the truth, even if it is unattainable, because the search for truth is what drives us to eliminate error. If there is no truth, there is no error and conversely. I have never come across a criticism of Popper that takes this it account, or a defense of the search for likelyhood that takes this sufficiently into account. The abandonment of truth, also means that we should abandon the search for error. This mistaken view can be read into the slogan often quoted by wilson:


All statements are true in some sense, false in some sense, meaningless in some sense, true and false in some sense, true and meaningless in some sense, false and meaningless in some sense, and true and false and meaningless in some sense.

This statement itself is just false.

I will be doing a longer critique of Wilson's epistemological views at some point, showing its strengths and weaknesses. Where he draws on Korzybski and in turn on Wittgenstein.

Footnotes

1. This is often referred to as the 'Popper Asymmetry' between falsification and verification

 

2.  it is not saved even if we weaken the demand to confirmation, for in order for evidence to confirm, the evidence itself has to be assumed to be certain)

3. This explanation might come from a further theory (as long as it is testable, consistent,  explains all the data the first theory did and has predictions which the first theory did not have), if we do not have this further theory, then the older theory, even in light of counter-evidence (although rendered problematic and labeled false) is kept.