Criticism of Critical Rationalism.

Critical rationalism is the idea that all our conjectures (guesses, theories, explanations) about the world are fallible, radically so. It is the idea that there is no such thing as justification. This is because justification itself leads to what is seen as an infinite regress of justifications of our justifications.

Recently I have been discussing the merits of CR with a facebook user, one who has kindly offered many  criticism on the what he calls the methods and foundations of CR. Criticisms that might appear at first to be reasonable, but later turn out to be trivial points that lead to no problematic conclusions. The first one he terms the "recursive falsificatory loop" later he say he means spiral rather than loop, but for our purposes this is irrelevant (His view can be found here). The recursive loop/spiral is this:

"If the Critical Rationalist’s falsification attempts are themselves fallible, shouldn’t he subject his falsification attempts to criticism as well? And shouldn’t he then further criticise the criticisms of his criticisms?"

A critical rationalist in a sense is not obligated to do anything other than accept that his explanation is fallible and keep it open to criticism from others. This is exactly inline with a critical rationalist point-of-view.

The reason that a person does not indefinitely criticize his own theory is because he is trying to solve a particular problem and at some point we need to apply  our explanation to the problem in order to solve it.

The other idea is that if there are two solutions to a problem which of the solutions should we use? We can use whichever one we want, this might be based on many factors in  a person or groups environment and preferences, but does not necessarily have anything to do with the merits of the theories in question.

The fact that we have two solutions leads to further problems-situations, if we have two explanations where we can further elaborate on the problem and create hypothetical situations in which each one would fail we can do so, but this creates a problem situation we can put aside in order to solve the problem at hand.

 The recursion here is just the idea that one problem-situation might lead to discovery of more problem situations, in which we have to criticize our current theories and the deeper theories they are embedded in. Whether a  theory "needs" to be criticized is determined by the people involved in a problem-situation.

The reason a person is not obligated to criticise his own theories or his own refutations indefinitely is because this would lead to him to not apply a solution to the problem he is ostensibly trying to solve, and therefore, if he has a theory, not putting his theory to the severest possible test ie the empirical test.  If there are refutations that we have of a particular theory, there will be a little dogmatism from people who hold the theory, So therefore if a person does not involve himself in criticizing his own refutation this role will be filled by others who wish to show that the refutation was not actually a refutation. This is because a person engaged in a problem-situation is not trying to get information necessarily beyond his own problem-situation, but knowledge itself has a way of encroaching on other people's problem situations, and in this way all a critical rationalist expects is that his solution will come under severe criticism from other people in different problem situations, and maybe at a later date a new problem situation he is in that has lead to him reconsidering attributes of his earlier solution that are based on faulty assumptions. This is the idea that although our theories are fallible, there is no point in assuming they are false, until we have a situation in which the explanation itself seems inadequate, even if there are two solutions (it is true that at least one of them is false, but we don't know which or if in fact both are false). This is why each theory that falsifies another theory explains why the early theory predicted the way it did and also explains its failure to solve the current problem at hand.

The reason this situation is different from the justificationist stance, is simply because the recursive function of justification does not lead to any new problem-situations, it leads to one problem: a regressive justification of justifications. Which is a non-problem, because justification is false.